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"INTERESTED DIRECTOR'S" CONTRACTS-SECTION 713
OF THE NEW YORK BUSINESS CORPORATION
LAW AND THE "FAIRNESS" TEST
1
"No man can serve two mnasters."

I.

INTRODUCTION

A decade of unprecedented expansion in the scope of regulatory legislation,
designed in part to protect the corporation, its shareholders, and the public
from abuses by corporate managers, 2 has concomitantly focused attention on
the duties and liabilities of corporate directors. 3 Generally speaking, a director's
duties to his corporation are threefold: he must be diligent,4 obedient 5 and undividedly loyal. 6 One aspect of the duty of loyalty arises when a director has an
interest in a corporate transaction which conflicts with that of his corporation. 7
1. Matthew 6:24 (King James).
2. One such area of growth has been the dramatic revolution in concepts of disclosure
concerning publicly-owned companies. Knauss, Disclosure Requirements-Changing Concepts of Liability, 24 Bus. Law. 43 (1968). Perhaps the most startling expansion has occurred
in private actions brought under Rule lob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 1 A.
Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud (SEC Rule 10b-S), at 3 (1971).
3. Increased liklihood of liability has shaken the very core of the corporate hierarchy
with the result that some directors are indeed "running scared." Israels, A New Look at
Corporate Directorship, 24 Bus. Law. 727 (1969).
4. The diligence standard is usually articulated in subjective terms. I. Wormser, Frankenstein, Incorporated 125 (1931). See also 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 990
(perm. ed. rev. 1965) [hereinafter cited by volume as Fletcher]. New York adheres to this
approach. Bown v. Ramsdell, 227 App. Div. 224, 237 N.Y.S. 573 (4th Dep't 1929). See
also Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 223 N.Y. 103, 105-06, 119 N.E. 237, 238
(1918). Some jurisdictions profess to require merely the absence of "gross negligence" from
corporate directors. See, e.g., Jones v. Foster, 70 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 558 (1934); Burkhart v. Smith, 161 Aid. 398, 403, 157 A. 299, 301 (1931). For a
general survey of the diligence duty see H. Ballantine, Corporations § 62 (rev. ed. 1946)
[hereinafter cited as Ballantine]; H. Henn, Law of Corporations § 231 (2d ed. 1970).
5. "[T]hey . . . owe a duty to keep within the powers of the corporation as well as
within those of the board of directors." I. Wormser, supra note 4, at 125. Professor Hornstein incorporates the duty of obedience within his framework of "honesty and good faith."
1 G. Horstein, Corporation Law and Practice § 431, at 527 & n.13 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as Hornstein].
6. For a classic enunciation of the New York standard see Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.YS.2d
667, 677 (Sup. Ct. 1940). See also Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 546 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Manacher v. Central Coal Co., 63 N.Y.S.2d 463, 465 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (corporate
opportunity).
7. As was stated in the leading case of Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503
(Sup. Ct. 1939): "Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position
of trust and confidence to further their private interests. ... The rule that requires an
undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict
between duty and self-interest." Id at 270, 5 A.2d at 510. In order for the director's interest
to conflict there must, of course, be a direct relationship between the private and personal
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Such conflicts have received different treatment by the courts in various periods
in our nation's history.8 They have been the subject of continuous litigation9
and constant debate, 10 and have recently received attention from legislatures in
a number of states."1
This Comment will discuss the law as it relates to transactions made with
"interested directors." Following a review of the development of case law in
New York, an attempt will be made to analyze and assess New York's revised
interested director's statute 2 and the adequacy of the "fairness" test to protect
against abuses by self-dealing directors.
II.

HISTORCAL DEVELOPMENT

A. Common Law
According to the weight of authority, at early common law a contract between a director and his corporation, or between corporations with interlocking
directorates, was voidable at the option of either corporation. 13 This rule was
premised upon the "great moral obligation to refrain from placing (oneself] ' in4
relations which ordinarily excite a conflict between self-interest and integrity. "I
The concept of "voidability" was conceived in England 15 and given impetus
in America in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Courts had adopted
theories of trust and agency to ascertain the validity of contracts involving inactivities of the director and the corporation. Young v. Bradley, 142 F.2d 658, 661 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 775 (1944) ; Ashman v. Miller, 101 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir, 1939) ;
Bisbee v. Midland Linseed Prods. Co., 19 F.2d 24, 29 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S.
564 (1927). See also Equity Corp. v. Milton, 42 Del. Ch. 425, 430, 213 A.2d 439, 442
(Ch. 1965), aff'd, 43 Del. Ch. 160, 221 A.2d 494 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
8. See Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22
Bus. Law. 35 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Marsh].
9. For an extensive treatment see 3 Fletcher §§ 913-88. See generally Hornstein §§ 439-40.
10. See Address by Lowell Wadmond, New York County Lawyer's Ass'n Forum Evening,
Oct. 24, 1963, condensed in 21 N.Y. County Law. Ass'n B. Bull. 120 (1963); Feuer, Liabilities
of Directors and Officers, 5 N.Y.L.F. 127, 139-57 (1959); Hetherington, Fact and Legal
Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 248,
256 (1969); Hoffman, The Status of Shareholders and Directors Under New York's Business
Corporation Law: A Comparative View, 11 Buffalo L. Rev. 496, 558-69 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as Hoffman]; Comment, The Corporate Fiduciary Duty Doctrine and the Requirement of Fairness in Parent-Subsidiary Relations, 76 Dick. L. Rev. 237 (1972); 16 Buffalo
L. Rev. 840 (1967).
11. A number of statutes dealing with interested directors' contracts are discussed in the
text accompanying notes 52 & 56 infra.
12. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
13. C. Elliott, A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations §§ 505-07 (3d ed. 1900);
see Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 589 (1875); Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C.
R.R., 103 N.Y. 58, 73-75, 8 N.E. 355, 358-59 (1886). See generally Hornstein § 439.
14. Michoud v. Girod, 45 US. (4 How.) 502, 554 (1846).
15. The leading case is Aberdeen Ry. v. Blaikie Bros., [1843-60] All E.R. 249 (HL. 1854).
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terested directors. 16 The application of these principles led many courts to declare that such transactions could be avoided "without regard to the question
of advantage or detriment .... 17 Indeed; it was announced that "corporations
are armed-with the right to repudiate such a transaction, no matter how fair
and open itmay be shown to be."1 s
Despite such declarations, however, a majority of courts refused to allow a
transaction to be avoided where the director contracted with his corporation
and a disinterestedmajority of the directors constituted a quorum and approved
the transaction, provided the transaction was fair, open, and free from fraud.20
A minority of courts--the New York court among them-adopted the more rigid
rule of allowing such transactions to be 2avoided
despite approval by a disinter-0
ested majority of the board of directors.
B.

The Minority Approach

In 1865 the New York Supreme Court 2 ' gave definitive consideration to an
agreement between corporations having common directors. The agreement pro16. A few cases described the director as a trustee and the stockholder as "cestui que
trust." Hubbard v. New York, N.E. & W. Inv. Co., 14 F. 675, 676 (D. Mass. 1882),
aff'd, 119 US. 696 (1887); Graves v. Mono Lake Hydraulic Mining Co., 81 Cal. 303, 319, 22
P. 665, 670 (1889); Gardner v. Butler, 30 N.J.Eq. 702, 709, 712 (Ch. 1879); Cumberland
Coal & Iron Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553, 570-72 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1859). Most courts,
however, realized that directors were not technically trustees since they did not hold legal
title
and usually did not have possession of the corporate property. These courts referred
to directors as quasi-trustees and held that the power to avoid arose out of the fiduciary
relationship of the director "to the corporation and to the stockholders as a body." 3
Fletcher § 838, at 172.
A minority of courts imposed agency principles to transactions involving interested directors, resulting in a few such transactions being condemned outright See Bill v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 16 F. 14, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1883); People v. Township Bd., 11 Mich. 222,
225-26 (1863) ("void as against public policy"); R. Harvey, A Hand-book of Corporation
Law 298-311 (1906).
17. O'Conner Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Coosa Furnace Co., 95 Ala. 614, 617, 10 S.290, 291
(1891). See Hoyle v. Plattsburgh & M. R.R., 54 N.Y. 314, 329 (1873); Attalla Iron Ore
Co. v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., 111 Tenn. 527, 537, 77 S.W. 774, 776 (1903). See
generally E. Pierce, A Treatise on the Law of Railroads 36 (1881).
18. O'Conner Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Coosa Furnace Co., 95 Ala. 614, 617, 10 S.290, 291
(1891) (citation omitted); see Henn, supra note 4, § 238; N. Lattin, The Law of Corporations § 80 (2d ed. 1971); 2 H. Oleck, Modern Corporation Law § 975 (1959); G. Seward,
Basic Corporate Practice 100 (1966); R. Stevens, Handbook on the Law of Private Corporations § 147 (2d ed. 1949).
19. See cases cited in W. Clark, Handbook of the Law of Private Corporations § 202,
at 642 n.99 (3d ed. 1916). For more recent cases see 1 Hornstein § 439, at 543 n.10.
20. See Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C.R.IR, 103 N.Y. 58, 8 N.E. 355 (1886).
21. Saint James Church v. Church of the Redeemer, 45 Barb. 356, 357, 31 How. Pr.
381, 382 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865). Two prior New York decisions laid the groundwork for the
court's finding. New York Cent. Ins. Co. v. National Protection Ins. Co, 14 N.Y. 85, 91
(1856) (contract held voidable in equity); Torrey v. Bank of Orleans, 9 Paige 648, 662
(N.Y. Ch. 1842).
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vided for the conveyance of real estate without consideration. 22 In categorically
declaring that "[t]he simple statement of these facts... establishes the fraudulent character of the conveyance"23 the court effectuated the principle that any
motive of personal aggrandizement "will constitute a badge of fraud" 24 when
the individual is acting in a double capacity as agent or trustee. This inflexible
rule was subsequently reaffirmed in a number of cases2 5 and was further rigidifled in 1886 in Munson v. Syracuse, Geneva & Corning R.R.20
In Munson, the New York Court of Appeals refused to decree specific performance of a contract involving a sale of property owned by Munson and his
associates. The court noted that Munson was also a director of the defendant
corporation, and therefore, it would "not stop to inquire whether the... transaction was fair or unfair" since the law "prevents frauds by making them...
impossible, knowing that real motives often elude the most searching
inquiry .... ,,27 Indeed, the court found the contract to be "repugnant to
the great rule of law which invalidates all [such] contracts . ..at the elec''
tion of the party . ..represent [ed]. 28
While it is questionable that the "great rule of law" in 1886 provided for
avoidance without regard to fairness, 29 it is clear that by 1900 courts in most
jurisdictions refused to follow the Munson approach. Instead, the courts simply
subjected contracts with interested directors to severe judicial scrutiny,80 holding
them voidable only if "unfair. '3' This change of approach resulted from the
growth of corporations and an increasing awareness on the part of the courts
that the best interests of the corporation may be furthered by transactions with
32
its own directors.
22.

Saint James Church v. Church of the Redeemer, 45 Barb. 356, 356-57, 31 How. Pr.

381, 381-82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865).

23.

Id. at 357, 31 How. Pr. at 382.

24.

Id.

25. Wallace v. Long Island R.R., 12 Hun 460 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1877). See Currier v. New
York, W.S. & B.R.R., 35 Hun. 355, 357 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1885); Marie v. Garrison, 13 Abb.
Cas. 210, 229-30 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1883).

26. 103 N.Y. 58, 8 N.E. 355 (1886).
27. Id. at 74, 8 N.E. at 358.
28. Id. at 73, 8 N.E. at 358.
29. While a majority of courts followed this rule (see note 18 supra and accompanying
text), a large number held that contracts involving interested directors were not per so
voidable. See, e.g., City of Griffin v. Inman, Swann & Co., 57 Ga. 370, 371, 377 (1876);
Alexander v. Williams, 14 Mo. App. 13, 28-29 (St. Louis Ct. App. 1883).
30. Davis v. United States Elec. Power & Light Co., 77 Md. 35, 41, 25 A. 982, 984
(1893); Hill v. Gould, 129 Mo. 106, 112, 30 S.W. 181, 182 (1895) ("Such contracts as
these are investigated very closely by the courts. They are not necessarily void, and are
not constructively fraudulent."). See also McGourkey v. Toledo & 0. Cent. Ry., 146 U.S.
536, 552 (1892).

31. Evansville Pub. Hall Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 144 Ind. 34, 36, 42 N.E. 1097, 1098
(1896). Old and classic illustrations of bad faith are cited in Hornstein § 439, at 543 n.9.
32. See Hornstein § 439, at 542; 2 H. Oleck, Modem Corporation Law § 975, at 763

(1959). As stated by Lattin, it is "a practical fact of corporate life that such transactions
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By the turn of the century New York also appeared to have renounced its
prophylactic treatment of interested director's contracts. In 1895 it was proclaimed by one court that "all acts of the directors of a corporation, within their
corporate powers, and 'done in good faith, are valid and binding, not only upon
the corporation, but upon each stockholder thereof.' "3 The court opined that
the rule permitting avoidance had been considerably relaxed in recent years,
largely because courts began to recognize that "it would be difficult to conduct
the affairs of the multifarious corporations of the country... if the element of
good faith, instead of individual interests, were not established as the basis of
intercorporateaction."34 Judicial response in New York to the "good faith"
test, however, was not enthusiasticP5 and subsequent New York cases vacillated
between this and the Munson approach.3 6
In perhaps an attempt to attain the best of both these approaches, a third
test was proposed by (then) Judge Cardozo in Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas
& Electric Co..3 7 decided in 1918. In Globe, a suit was brought to compel the
specific performance of contracts to supply electric current to the plaintiff's
mills. The record showed that the plaintiff's president had served as a director
for both corporations. After carefully weighing the evidence, the court declared
the contracts "voidable at the election of the defendant." 30 One piece of evidence which the court paid particular attention to was the unfairness of the
contract to the corporation. 39 Prior to Globe, the New York courts had refused
are frequent and often to the advantage of the corporation. Then, too, there has been the
surprising discovery . . . that directors, for the most part, are not bent on skulduggery."
Lattin, supra note 18, § 80 at 290-91. Note, The Effect of Common Officers in Intercorporate
Transactions, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 598 (1933) ("It became gradually apparent . . . such
dealings . . . were not necessarily diabolical ...
"). Id.
33. Genesee Valley & Wyo. Ry. v. Retsof Mining Co., 15 Misc. 187, 195, 36 N.Y.S. 896,
901 (Sup. Ct. 1895) (emphasis added).
34. Id. (citing, inter alla, Twin-Lick Oil Co., 91 US. 587 (1875)) (emphasis added).
35. See Burden v. Burden, 159 N.Y. 287, 307, 54 N.E. 17, 23 (1899). But see Boaz v.
Sterlingworth Ry. Supply Co., 68 App. Div. 1, 4, 73 N.YS. 1039, 1041 (Ist Dep't 1902);
Jacobus v. American Mineral Water Mach. Co., 38 Misc. 371, 372-73, 77 N.Y.S. 898, 899
(Sup. Ct. 1902). See also Polhemus v. Polhemus, 43 Misc. 141, 144, 88 N.Y.S. 273, 274

(Sup. Ct. 1904).
36. Billings v. Shaw, 209 N.Y. 265, 279-80, 103 N.E. 142, 147 (1913); cf. C.S. Goss &
Co. v. Goss, 147 App. Div. 698, 701, 132 N.YS. 76, 78 (1st Dep't 1911), aff'd, 207 N.Y.
742, 101 N.E. 1099 (1913).
37. 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918).
38. 224 N.Y. at 488-89, 121 N.E. at 379. It should be noted that the court in Globe did
pay lip service to Munson by stating that "the great rule of law" enunciated there also
applies to transactions where the interested director did not vote for adoption. Id. at 489,
121 N.E. at 379.
39. "We hold that the constant duty rests on a trustee . . . to protest . . . if
he gains what is unfair.... [Tlhere is evidence that in the making of these contracts,
that duty was ignored . . . ?I Id. at 492, 121 N.E. at 381. It is interesting to note that
dictum in Globe seems to advocate viewing fairness in respect to how the contract developed
subsequent to approval. ("He takes the risk of an enforced surrender of his bargain if it
turns out to be improvident.") Id. at 490, 121 N.E. at 380.
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to consider
this element, generally holding all such transactions ipso facto
40
voidable.
With the inclusion of the Globe test of fairness, cases between 1918 and 1942
evidenced a growing uncertainty as to which approach to apply. 41 In 1942,
however, the New York Court of Appeals, in Everett v. Phillips, 42 came to
grips with this problem. In attempting to clarify the law involving interested
directors, the court refused to accept the argument that a transaction between
corporations having common directors was voidable without regard to fairnessa 5
That it was not the court's intention to establish a rigid prophylaxis to selfdealing is evident from its resolve to "scrutinize these transactions with care"
rather than to render them voidable per se. 44 Indeed, since the plaintiff had
failed to show that the directors had acted in disregard of their duties, the
judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. Moreover, in reaching this
conclusion the majority chose to disregard the more restrictive approaches of
Munson and Globe.45 The dissent in Everett, however, relied on these cases in

vocally protesting the courts "balanc[ing] of benefits" in regard to transaction.4 0
Despite its sub silentio renunciation of Munson, the Phillips court did not lay

to rest the issue of which test ought to be employed; and Munson continued to
40. See Hoffman 560-62; 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 840, 841-42 (1967).
41. For an interesting portrayal of the court's uncertainty over which approach to follow,
see Norwegian-American Sec. Corp. v. Schenstrom, 124 Misc. 235, 207 N.Y.S. 163 (Sup.
Ct. 1924). See also In re Mlichelbacher, 226 App. Div. 858, 241 N.Y.S. 178 (1st Dep't 1929)
(per curiam), aff'd, 253 N.Y. 515, 171 N.E. 762 (1930).
In 1926, the Munson approach was reaffirmed by the New York Court of Appeals. Wendt
v. Fischer, 243 N.Y. 439, 154 N.E. 303 (1926). See Silberkraus v. Reinhard, 221 App. Div.
615, 617-18, 225 N.Y.S. 14, 16 (3d Dep't 1927); Pink v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 164 Misc.
128, 134-35, 298 N.Y.S. 544, 553 (Sup. Ct. 1937). In an attempt to traverse the rigid
Munson rule, a number of courts distinguished that case on rather dubious grounds. l1ne
v. Lausterer, 135 Misc. 397, 406-07, 238 N.Y.S. 276, 287-88 (Sup. Ct. 1930), aff'd, 232 App.
Div. 719, 248 N.Y.S. 806 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 257 N.Y. 523, 178 N.E. 778 (1931). But see
In re American Tel. & Cable Co., 139 Misc. 625, 627, 248 N.Y.S. 98, 100 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
See also Haff v. Long Island Fuel Corp., 233 App. Div. 117, 121, 251 N.Y.S. 67, 70 (2d
Dep't 1931). In spite of such attempts to erode the Munson doctrine, it was cryptically
reaffirmed in Hauben v. Morris, 161 Misc. 174, 291 N.Y.S. 96 (Sup. Ct. 1936), rev'd on other
grounds, 255 App. Div. 35, 5 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1st Dep't 1938), afi'd mem., 281 N.Y. 652, 22
N.E.2d 482 (1939).
42. 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942), noted in 11 Fordbarn L. Rev. 311 (1942).
43. 288 N.Y. at 236, 43 N.E.2d at 22. In support of this determination, the court referred to two Supreme Court and two New York cases: Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining
Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921); United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S,
261 (1917); Koral v. Savory, Inc., 276 N.Y. 215, 11 N.E.2d 883 (1937); Sage v. Culver,
147 N.Y. 241, 41 N.E. 513 (1895). According to the court, the provision in the certificate
of incorporation expressly authorizing the directors to enter transactions in which they have
a personal interest, had the effect "of exonerating the directors, at least In part, 'from adverse inferences which might otherwise be drawn against them.'" 288 N.Y. at 237, 43
N.E.2d at 22 (citation omitted).
44. 288 N.Y. at 237, 43 N.E.2d at 22.
45. See text accompanying notes 26-41 supra.
46. 288 N.Y. at 240, 43 NE.2d at 23 (Desmond, J., dissenting).
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be cited favorably by the New York courts 4 7 For instance, in In re People
(Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co.) 8 the rule of "uncompromising rigidity"4
was resurrected by the majority. Although In re People involved improprieties
by attorneys for trustees who were appointed to aid holders of first mortgage
certificates in a corporate reorganization and is therefore factually distinguishable from Phillips, it was subsequently relied on in a strong dissent in La Vin
v. La Vin 5o to sustain its advocacy of the restrictive rule of Munson. Refusing
to follow the majority, the dissent in La Vin disagreed "that the principles of
law expressed in Munson.. . as to the responsibility of directors as fiduciaries
has been so relaxed or modified as to be practically meaningless.Y' 1 In finding
2
such a relaxation the majority had relied squarely on Phillips:"
Despite the holding in In re People, reliance on Phillips by the majority in
La Vin, appears to have been well placed in light of Piccard v. Sperry Corp.P
In Piccard, a federal court was given the opportunity to decipher New York
law in regard to conflicts of interest, and categorically determined that "[t]o
the extent that Munson ... may be said to impose a more rigid standard, it
yields to the more moderate view expressed by both prevailing and dissenting
opinions in Everett v. Phillips .... ,54
C. The Majority Rule
While this "crazy-quilt of authority" 55 was developing in New York, California was experiencing similar difficulties with respect to interested director contracts. As had the New York courts,5" those of California stated that such
contracts were void or voidable in cases of dual directorships.5 7 However, where
the director dealt with his corporation and the transaction was affirmed by a
47. See, e.g., Yaeger v. Phillips, 128 N.Y.S.2d 376, 380 (Sup. Ct. 1953), appeal dismissed,
283 App. Div. 929, 131 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1st Dep't 1954); cf. In re Hammer, 23 Misc. 2d
362, 364, 198 N.Y.S.2d 689, 692 (Sur. Ct. 1960), rev'd, 16 App. Div. 2d 111, 225 N.Y.S.2d
868 (1st Dep't 1962) (per curiam), aft'd, 12 N.Y.2d 893, 188 N.E.2d 266, 237 N.Y.S.2d
1001 (1963).
48. 303 N.Y. 423, 103 N.E.2d 721 (1952).
49. Id. at 431, 103 N.E.2d at 725.
50. 283 App. Div. 809, 128 N.Y.S.2d 518 (2d Dep't), aff'd mem., 307 N.Y. 790, 121
N.E.2d 620 (1954).
51. Id., 128 N.Y.S.2d at 520 (dissenting opinion) (citation omitted) (distinguishing
Phillips on the basis of the certificate of incorporation which allowed self-dealing in that
case).
52. Id., 128 N.YS.2d at 518.
53. 48 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd, 152 F.2d 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328
U.S. 845 (1946).
54. Id. at 467 (citations omitted).
55. Hoffman 564. See 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 840 (1967).
56. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
57. See Curtin v. Salmon River Hydraulic Gold Mining & Ditch Co., 130 Cal. 345, 348-49,
62 P. 552, 554 (1900); Graves v. Mono Lake Hydraulic Aining Co., 81 Cal. 303, 320, 22
P. 665, 670 (1889); Davis v. Rock Creek Lumber, Flume & Mining Co., 55 Cal. 359, 364,
36 Am. R. 40, 43 (1880). See also Wickersham v. Crittenden, 93 Cal. 17, 29, 28 P. 788,
790 (1892).

646
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disinterested majority or quorum, the California courts held the contract voidable only upon a showing of unfairness, unreasonableness, or fraud.5 8 In other
words, California refused to follow the early New York approach which permitted such a contract to be set aside upon the sole ground that it was entered
into with an interested director.5 9
While it is clear that the treatment of interested directors' contracts by the
California courts was less strict than that of New York, individuals organizing
corporations in California nevertheless considered the California approach excessively rigid in light of the "exigencies of modern business."600 For example,
the growth of corporations demanded increased managerial expertise. As a
result, leaders of the industrial and financial worlds began to sit as directors for
many different corporations. 6' To facilitate active participation by these individuals, rules were suggested which would not permit interested directors'
02
contracts to be set aside unless they were unfair, unreasonable, or fraudulent.
These suggestions were incorporated into the California Civil Code of 1931. e3
The amended version of this statute" was the model for section 713 of the New
York Business Corporation Law.05
58. Dean v. Shingle, 198 Cal. 652, 658, 246 P. 1049, 1051 (1926); Pacific Vinegar &
Pickle Works v. Smith, 145 Cal. 352, 78 P. 550 (1904); North Confidence Mining & Dev.
Co. v. Fitch, 58 Cal. App. 329, 333, 208 P. 328, 329 (3d Dist. 1922). See Smith v. Los
Angeles Immigration & Land Co-op. Ass'n, 78 Cal. 289, 20 P. 677 (1889) (cn banc);
Wilbur v. Lynde, 49 Cal. 290, 292, 19 Am. R. 645, 646 (1874).
59. Scbnittger v. Old Home Consol. Mining Co., 144 Cal. 603, 607, 78 P. 9, 10 (1904);
Fudickar v. East Riverside Irr. Dist., 109 Cal. 29, 41 P. 1024 (1895); Merrill v. Normandle
Corp., 110 Cal. App. 621, 294 P. 774 (1st Dist. 1930); Todd v. Temple Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 96
Cal. App. 42, 46, 273 P. 595, 597 (1st Dist. 1928) (per curiam); California & Arizona
Land Co. v. Cuddeback, 27 Cal. App. 450, 454-55, 150 P. 379, 381 (2d Dist. 1915). See
also Stack v. Welder, 137 Cal. App. 647, 652, 31 P.2d 426, 428 (4th Dist. 1934).
60. See Comment, Corporations: Effect upon Contracts of Adverse Interest of Directors:
Interlocking Directorates, 19 Calif. L. Rev. 304, 312 (1931).
61. See generally Note, Restrictions on the Power of a Director to Contract With His
Corporation, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 338, 344 (1929).
62. Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law, 19 Calif. L.
Rev. 465, 475-76 (1931).
63. Law of Aug. 14, 1931, ch. 862, § 311, [19311 Cal. Laws 1777-78, codified at Cal.
Corp. Code § 820 (West 1955). See also Ballantine, Problems in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law, 17 A.B.A.J. 579, 580 (1931).
64. Cal. Corp. Code § 820 (West 1955).
65. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (Supp. 1972). See Revised Supplement to Fifth Interim Report to 1961 Session of the New York State Legislature,
1961 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 12, at 68. The New York Business Corporation Law has been
the subject of extensive comment: Anderson & Lesher, The New Business Corporation Law,
pts. I & II, 33 N.Y. St. B.J. 308, 428 (1961); De Capriles & McAniff, The Financial Provision
of the New (1961) New York Business Corporation Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1239 (1961);
Hoffman, New Horizons for the Close Corporation in New York Under Its New Business
Corporation Law, 28 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1 (1961); Simon & Davis, The New York Business
Corporation Law and the Department of State, 36 St. John's L. Rev. 205 (1962); Stevens,
New York Business Corporation Law of 1961, 47 Cornell L.Q. 141 (1962); Symposium
-New York Business Corporation Law, 11 Buffalo L. Rev. 429 (1962).
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Section 713 of the New York Business Corporation Law, which became effective in 1963, was specifically aimed at eliminating the inconsistent positions
represented by Munson and Phillips.66 According to one commentator, "the sole
function Section 713 is designed to subserve is simply to eliminate the Munson
case as 68a controlling precedent," 67 in favor of the more flexible approach of
Phillips.
In essence, section 713 (a) established that a contract or transaction involving
an interested director was not automatically void or voidable by reason alone
of the director's personal interest providing that any one of three statutory
requirements had been met:
(1) If the fact of such common directorship, officership or financial interest is dis-

closed or known to the board or committee, and the board or committee approves
such contract or transaction by a vote sufficient for such purpose without counting the

vote or votes of such interested director or directors; 6

(2) If such common directorship, officership or financial interest is disclosed or
known to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and such contract or transaction
is approved by vote of the shareholders; or 7 o
(3) If the contract or transaction is fair and reasonable as to the corporation at
the time it is approved by the board, a committee or the shareholders. 7 '

These provisions received mixed reviews from the legal community. 72 While
66. See Revised Supplement to Fifth Interim Report to 1961 Session of the New York
State Legislature, 1961 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 12, at 49.
67. Hoffman 566 (footnote omitted).
68. Revised Supplement, supra note 66, at 49.
69. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713(a)(1) (McKinney 1963), as amended, (Supp. 1972).
Since no reference was made by this paragraph to self-dealing by officers, the question
arose as to whether they would be subject to the same rules as directors. Cf. Andrevs,
The New York Business Corporation Law, 28 Albany L. Rev. 45, 49 (1964). It was finally
determined that officers were governed "by BCL § 717 and common law rather than
BCL § 713.' M. Fogelman, McKinney's Forms-Business Corporation Law § 5:35, at 509
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Fogelman].
70. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713(a)(2) (McKinney 1963), as amended, (Supp. 1972).
This subsection was construed as not changing the rule established in Continental Securities
Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912), wherein the court stated: "In any case
where action is taken by stockholders confirming and ratifying a fraud and misapplication
of the funds of the corporation by the directors or others the action is binding only by
way of estoppel upon such stockholders as vote in favor of such approval." Id. at 18, 99
N.E. at 142 (citation omitted). See 3 White, New York Corporations 1 713.01, at 7-153
to -154 n.16 (13th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as White].
71. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713(a) (3) (MIcKinney 1963), as amended, (Supp. 1972).
The codification is of the rule enunciated in Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E2d
18 (1942); and Sage v. Culver, 147 N.Y. 241, 41 N.E. 513 (1895); see text accompanying
notes 42-52 supra.
72. See C. Israels, Corporate Practice § 9.19 (2d ed. 1969) (hereinafter cited as Israels];
Kessler, The New York Business Corporation Law, 36 St. John's L. Rev. 1, 74-76 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Kessler]; 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 840 (1967).
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most authorities favored the statute's approach, 73 it was generally conceded that
it raised as many questions as it resolved. 74 Ambiguous language75 in the statute
prompted inquiries as to whether disclosure alone would be sufficient to validate
a "transaction which was in fact unfair at the time of its approbation. '70 By
7
reference to such cases as Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 7 and
78
would
it
that
concluded
Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., legal scholars
not be. 79 Any other interpretation would have had the effect of rendering the
disclosure and approval requirements meaningless since they were intended as
a protection against unfairness.
Poor draftsmanship by the legislature resulted in an additional query as to
whether the burden of proving fairness had been placed on the interested
director or had been shifted conclusively to the plaintiff.80 In answering this
question, most authorities adopted the approach of Geddes v. Anaconda Copper
Mining Co., 81 that the burden of proving fairness fell upon the interested or
common director who sought to maintain the transaction. 82 However, others,
73. Ham, Suggestions for Modernizing the Kentucky General Corporation Law to Meet
the Needs of Close Corporations, 52 Ky. L.J. 527, 549 (1964); Kessler 18-19.
74. E.g., Folk, Corporation Law Developments-1969, 56 Va. L. Rev. 755, 782 (1970);
Hetherington, Trends in Legislation for Close Corporations: A Comparison of the Wisconsin
Business Corporation Law of 1951 and the New York Business Corporation Law of 1961,
1963 Wis. L. Rev. 92, 148-51.
75. The crux of the problem seems to have been that the three exceptions to section
713 were "set forth as seeming alternatives." Weiss, Business Associations and Securities
Regulations, 23 Syracuse L. Rev. 331, 334 (1972). The implication was that if any one of
these three exceptions were met, the transaction could not be avoided. However, by keying
on the phrase "by reason alone of the directors interest," many authorities correctly interpreted the statute as providing "at most a 'first-line' of defense." Israels § 9.19, at 296; see
Fogelman 154 (Supp. 1972).
76. 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 840, 841 (1967).
77. 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1st Dist. 1952). In Remillard, New York's
statutory model, section 820 of the California Corporations Code, was interpreted by a
California District Court of Appeal to require fairness despite technical compliance with
the disclosure provision. The court held that "neither section 820 . . . nor any other provision of the law automatically validates such transactions simply because there has been a
disclosure and approval by the majority of the stockholders." Id. at 418, 241 P.2d at 74.
78. 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 260 P.2d 823 (1st Dist. 1952). In Kennerson, the court reaffirmed its holding in Remillard by stating that "appropriate relief" would be granted
despite technical compliance with statutory requirements "in case of unfair dealing to the
detriment of minority stockholders . . . ." Id. at 171, 260 P.2d at 831. For a comparison
of section 820 of the California Corporation Code and the Model Corporations Act, see
Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23
Law & Contemp. Prob. 193, 201 (1958). See also Stevens, New York Business Corporation
Law of 1961, 47 Cornell L.Q. 141, 162 (1962).
79. See Fogelman 510; Vhite IT 713.01, at 7-155 to -156 n.21. See also Hornstein 210
(Supp. 1968).
80. Israels § 9.19, at 296.
81. 254 U.S. 590 (1921). "[Tlhe burden is upon those who would maintain them [transactions with interested directors] to show their entire fairness .... " Id. at 599.
82. See, e.g., 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 840, 842 (1967).
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including the late Professor Israels, acknowledged that the statute might have
shifted the burden to the plaintiffs.83 Despite this provisions drawbacks, other
provisions were more adroitly handled by the legislature, such as the problem of
requiring a quorum of disinterested directors to approve transactions with selfdealing directors.

A. Disinterested Quorum Rule
Paragraph (b) of section 713 resolved a long-standing problem# by au-

thorizing common or interested directors to be counted in determining the
presence of a "quorum at a meeting... which approves such contract or trans-

action."8' 5 This provision constituted a distinct departure from New York case
law86 which generally disqualified the interested party for quorum purposes 8 7

A number of other jurisdictions have also codified disinterested quorum provisions. Delaware,es for instance, has promulgated a provision similar to New

York's on the theory that "the proposed transaction should... not be thwarted
at the threshold because a quorum can only be found by including the interested
directors."8 9
Rhode Island's statute90 specifically provided that the contracting or common
director(s) were not to vote on the question and could not be counted in ascertaining whether or not a quorum was present. 9 ' In 1956, a significant amendment was made to this statute stipulating that "[a] contract not otherwise void

or voidable shall not be rendered void or voidable merely because not approved
or ratified in accordance with the foregoing provisions."02 Despite this addition,
however, the result was the same since under Rhode Island case law9 3 an interested director could not be counted for quorum purposes. However, in 1969 this
83. Israels § 9.19, at 296.
84. See Revised Supplement, supra note 66, at 49; S. Corwin, Acme's Corporation
Practice Under the BCL 281 (1965).
85. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713(b) (AcKinney 1963), as amended, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 713(c) (McKinney Supp. 1972). For further discussion of this subsection see White
ff 713.01, at 7-154.
86. Butts v. Wood, 37 N.Y. 317, 318 (1867). See also Atwater v. Elkhorn Valley CoalLand Co., 184 App. Div. 253, 256, 171 N.Y.S. 552, 555 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 227 N.Y. 611
(1918); Turner v. American Metal Co., 36 N.Y..2d 356, 377 (Sup. CL 1942), rev'd on
other grounds, 268 App. Div. 239, 50 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1st Dep't 1944).
87. White II 713.01, at 7-154.
88. The Delaware statute provides that "[clommon or interested directors may be
counted in determining the presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors
or of a committee which authorizes the contract or transaction" Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,
§ 144(b) (Supp. 1970).
89. E. Folk, The New Delaware Corporation Law 11 (1967).
90. R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-4-7 (1956).
91. See Duncan Shaw Corp. v. Standard Mach. Co., 196 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1952). See
also Matteson v. Win. S. Street & Son, Inc., 58 R.L 411, 416, 193 A. 171, 172-73 (1937).
92. R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-4-7 (1956) (emphasis added). The purpose of the amendment
seems to have been to change the strict rule stated in Matteson v. Win. S. Street & Son,
Inc., 58 R-I. 411, 193 A. 171 (1937).
93. See Goldberg v. Peltier, 75 R.I. 314, 320, 66 A.2d 107, 110 (1949).

650

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

statute was repealed. 9 4 A new statue,95 instituted in its stead, does not deal
directly with the disinterested quorum issue. Nevertheless, by refusing to incorporate a quorum provision into the current statute, the legislature appears to
be expressing its intent to allow interested directors to be counted for quorum
purposes. 96
In certain instances West Virginia allows a transaction to be approved even
by a number less than a quorum. 97 However, where the interested director votes
in favor of the transaction, and his presence was necessary to constitute a
quorum, a presumption of fraud arises. 98
It is submitted that New York has taken an enlightened approach by allowing interested directors to be counted for quorum purposes. It appears that
corporate interests can sufficiently be protected by requiring "full disclosure,
[and] approval by disinterested directors or by shareholders"0 9 without outlawing a possible quorum simply because of the director's interest.
While the disinterested quorum rule is both technical and procedural, the
legislature has also attacked with dispatch more substantive elements of the
"interested" director problem, such as the authority of directors to establish
their own remuneration.
B. Director's Compensation
The common law rule in New York prohibited the board of directors from
fixing their own compensation without specific authorization by statute, by-law,
or charter. 100 This restriction stemmed from the rule "that directors . . . necessarily [act] in a fiduciary capacity, [and are] prohibited from using corporate
moneys for their own benefit."''1
94. Law of May 8, 1956, ch. 3785, § 1, [1956] R.I. Public Laws 659 (repealed 1969).
95. R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-1.1-37.1 (Supp. 1972).
96. The Michigan statute is also silent on this point, and courts have not specifically
construed the statute to determine if a director may be counted for a quorum. Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 450.13(5) (1967). For an unequivocal statement of the common law rule see Veeser
v. Robinson Hotel Co., 275 Mich. 133, 137-38, 266 N.W. 54, 55-56 (1936). But see Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13, 23 (E.D. Mich. 1950), aft'd sub nom. Masterson v.
Pergament, 203 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1953). However, unlike Rhode Island, Michigan has
never statutorily proscribed counting interested directors for a quorum. Consequently, the
ambiguity of the Michigan statute should cause "the prudent director . . .to make certain
that . .. [the] transaction [was approved] 'by a quorum of disinterested directors . . .
authorized to contract for it.'" Comment, Dealings Between Directors And Their Corpora.
tions-A Discussion Of The "Disinterested Quorum" Rule Under Present Statutory Limitations In Michigan, 34 U. Det. L.J. 42, 54 (1956).
97. W. Va. Code Ann. § 31-1-69 (1966).
98. Hope v. Valley City Salt Co., 25 W. Va. 789, 807 (1885). See also Arnold v. Knapp,
75 XV. Va. 804, 812, 84 S.E. 895, 899 (1915).
99. E. Folk, supra note 89, at 11.
100. See Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 131, 105 N.E. 818, 821 (1914);
Herman v. Gutman, 244 App. Div. 694, 696, 280 N.Y.S. 410, 412 (1st Dep't 1935); Palmer
v. Scheftel, 183 App. Div. 77, 81, 170 N.Y.S. 588, 590 (1st Dep't 1918).
101. White II 713.02, at 7-157; see Hoffman 567. The assumption was that directors,
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In fact, it was assumed that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
the director was to render his official services gratuitously.10 2 However, a contract for compensation was implied where the director was asked to perform
10 3
functions above or beyond his ordinary duties.
Early attempts by directors to get around the rule against fixing their own
compensation, by voting salaries to directors in their capacity as officers, were
unsuccessful. 04 Historically such attempts resulted in the transaction being
held void or voidable. 0 5 However, as noted by Professor Hoffman,100 more
recent cases have not followed the traditional rule, holding instead that such a
scrutiny-and would be voidable only if made in
transaction "requires careful
0 7
bad faith or fraudulently."'
Paragraph (c) of section 713 changed New York law' 08 by allowing the board
to fix the compensation of directors for services in any capacity "[u]nless
otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws .... 210
This provision has been criticized as an excessive relaxation of the fiduciary
duty of corporate directors." 0 One authority found the provision "either a
shocking example of poor draftsmanship, or of callous disregard for the rights
of corporate shareholders, out of whose pockets, it is obvious, this money will
generally being large shareholders themselves, would receive adequate compensation through
dividends. 6 Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations with Tax Planning § 124.03 (1972). Thus,
the remuneration they received was actually a form of profit sharing and served as an
incentive for directors to be particularly diligent in their corporate affair. See National
Loan & Inv. Co. v. Rockland Co., 94 F. 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1899).
102. See Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 131, 105 N.E. 818, 821 (1914);
Stout v. Security Trust & Life Ins. Co., 82 App. Div. 129, 132, 81 N.YS. 703, 710 (1st
Dep't 1903) (dictum). Since the director performed his duties gratuitously, he could be
required to repay any compensation received. Note, Corporate Director Liability-The Utah
Law in Theory and Practice, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 660, 675.
103. Bagley v. Carthage W. & S.H.R.R., 165 N.Y. 179, 182, 58 N.E. 895, 896 (1900);
Stout v. Security Trust & Life Ins. Co., 82 App. Div. 129, 131, 81 N.YS. 703, 710 (1st
Dep't 1903). But see Kelsey v. Sargent, 40 Hun 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 1886). An expectation of
compensation for rendering extraordinary services was necessary for the implication to arise.
Gill v. New York Cab Co., 48 Hun 524, 526-27, 1 N.YS. 202, 203 (App. Div. 1888).
104. Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 105 N.E. 818 (1914).
105. Jacobson v. Brooklyn Lumber Co., 184 N.Y. 152, 162-63, 76 N.E. 1075, 1078 (1906)
(transaction held voidable despite evidence showing salary was commensurate with the increased business and resulting profit of the corporation). But see Carr v. Kimball, 153 App.
Div. 825, 841, 139 N.Y.S. 253, 264 (1st Dep't 1912), affd mem., 215 N.Y. 634, 109 N.E.
1068 (1915).
106. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School and a Drafting and Research Consultant
on Articles 7 and 9 of the Business Corporation Law to the New York Joint Legislative
Committee to Study Revision of Corporation Laws.
107. Hoffman 568; see Martin Foundation, Inc. v. Phillips-Jones Corp., 283 App. Div.
729, 127 N.Y.S.2d 649 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 972, 120 N.E.2d 230 (1954).
108. Revised Supplement, supra note 66, at 49. See Hornstein § 440 (Supp. 1968); White
7-158.
109. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713(c) (McKinney 1963), as amended, (Supp. 1972).
110. Kessler 76-77.
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come."i" The validity of this criticism, however, appears dubious, unless the

Model Business Corporation Act of 1966112 and statutes in at least thirteen
states"13 also constitute "shocking examples of poor draftsmanship." Moreover,

allowing directors to fix their own compensation benefits the corporation since
directors are in the best position to determine what salary will attract corporate
leaders to fill vacant board positions. Finally, while shareholder ratification of
the salaries fixed is obtainable, this is fundamentally an illusory device since
"inthe nature of things the stockholders cannot negotiate for a lower figure.
patently unreasonable, the
They will merely be asked to approve, as not being
4
amount determined by the board of directors.""1

It is interesting to note the procedural variations encompassed in the statutes
allowing directors to fix their compensation. While most such statutes require
a simple majority of those present to validate such transactions, provided a
quorum is obtained,"15 the District of Columbia 10 and Illinois" 7 require the
affirmative vote of a majority of the directors then in office.
Wisconsin's provision" 8 is similar to those of the District of Columbia and
Illinois, providing further that the board may delegate its authority in fixing
compensation to an appropriate committee. 1 9 This device should prove salutary,

unless the courts allow such delegation to be used as a subterfuge for fixing
excessive compensation.

Utah allows the board to fix compensation but requires that such arrange-

ments be reported to the shareholders.120 Consequently, the shareholders are
111. Id. at 77. Adverse interest may, however, only constitute a "technical defect." It Is
the reasonableness of the compensation that is the critical factor. Latty, Some Miscellaneous
Novelties in the New Corporation Statutes, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 363, 372-73 (1958).
112. "The board of directors shall have authority to fix the compensation of directors
unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation." ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp.
Act Ann. 2d § 35, at 752 (1971).
113. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 64-301 (1966); Iowa Code Ann. § 496A.34 (Supp. 1972);
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-2035 (1969); NJ). Cent. Code § 10-19-36 (1960); Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-10-33 (1962); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-36.33 (1965). New Jersey, Ohio and Wisconsin
insert the term "reasonable" in referring to compensation. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:6-8(3)
(1969); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.60 (Page 1964); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.31 (1957).
However, this addition does not appear to be significant since unreasonable rates can always
be challenged.
114. Marsh 58.
115. See, e.g., Ala. Code tit. 10, §§ 21(24), 21(27)(a) (Supp. 1971); Alaska Stat.
22 10.05.174, 10.05.192 (1968); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 64-301, 64-305(A) (1966); Iowa Code
Ann. §§ 496A.34 (Supp. 1972), 496A.38 (1962); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 21-2035, 21-2040 (Supp.
1969).
116. D.C. Code Ann. § 29-916 (1967).
117. II. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.33 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972).
118. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180,31 (1957); see Hetherington, supra note 74, at 147. For the
early Wisconsin common law rule regarding compensation see Thauer v. Gaebler, 202 Wis.
296, 301, 232 N.W. 561, 563 (1930).
119. For an analysis of the Wisconsin provision see Hetherington, supra note 74, at 147.
120. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-33 (1962). Utah followed the majority common law rule.
Toponce v. Corinne Mill, Canal & Stock Co., 6 Utah 439, 444, 24 P. 534, 536 (1890), afl'd,
152 U.S. 405 (1894).

-
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put on immediate notice and can seek relief where inflated rates are fixed.
In this setting the New York provision, currently codified in the revised
edition to section 713, does not appear to disregard the right of shareholders. 12 1
If abuses do occur it is universally acknowledged that shareholders may bring
an action to set the transaction aside. 122 Moreover, while this provision has
been criticized, it at least has the virtue of clarity. Unfortunately, the same
cannot be said of the provision allowing board or shareholder approval of the
interested director's contract or of the 1965 amendment to this provision.
C. The 1965 Amendment
In 1965,123 section 713 was amended by substituting the word "authorize"
for "approval" wherever found.'2 4 This amendment was designed to end the
confusion which had resulted from inconsistent use of such similar terms as
"adopt," "authorize" and "approve.' 1 5 Notwithstanding this intention, however, confusion continued.
By referring to board or shareholder "approval," the statute had been read
to "[include] action taken either before or after the fact. " 20- The amended
version, by implication,' 27 seemed to require board action before the fact and
thus presented a less flexible standard. However, the Joint Legislative Committee, in explaining the amendment stated:
(2) The word "authorize" is used whenever the directors or shareholders:
I(b)'Are undertaking a particular corporate activity, and the reference in the
Business Corporation Law is to the transaction in its generic or total aspect ....12
From this explanation it was possible to argue that a transaction initiated by
the interested director could be undertaken by the corporation in a subsequent
129
action.
Whether requiring approval or authorization, this provision made clear that
the fairness of the contract or transaction was to be tested as of the time of
action by the board, a committee or the stockholders. Consequently, the risk
of unfairness developing later was, of necessity, assumed by the corporation.
The problems emanating from the ambiguous language in this section should
121. See note 111 supra and accompanying text.
122. "The plethora of litigation on the subject and the 'juicy' cases that have resulted
therefrom make it almost too trite to observe that adequate remedies are available against
directors who vote themselves excessive compensation ....
" Hoffman 569. See Hornstein
§ 440 (Supp. 1968).
123. Law of July 15, 1965, ch. 803, § 29, [19651 N.Y. Laws 1142 (repealed 1971).
124. See Israels § 6.13, at 196-97.
125. G. Hornstein, Supplemental Analysis of Business Corporation Law, N.Y. Bus. Corp.
Law app. 1, at 66 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
126. Israels § 6.13, at 196.
127. Id. at 197.
128. Ninth Interim Report to 1965 Session of New York State Legislature, 1965 N.Y.
Legis. Doc. No. 24, at 132-33 (emphasis added). Subdivision (2)(a) deals with corporate
activity initiated by directors or shareholders, thus distinguishing it from subdivision (2) (b).
129. Id.
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evidence the statute's inadequacy as a mechanism for establishing certainty in
the law surrounding interested directors' contracts. Unfortunately, any expectations that the legislature was lending a favorable ear to the continuous and
often well-reasoned criticisms13" of this statute seem to have been disappointed
by the revised version of section 713.
713 REvISED
In 1971, section 713 of the New York Business Corporation Law was repealed by the legislature and a revised version implemented in its stead. 13' The
new statute constitutes a significant relaxation of fiduciary duty of a director
to his corporation and its shareholders. 13 2
Subsection (a) of the revised statute is similar to its predecessor with one
important addition. Whereas the old statute, by implication, simply required
that a director or officer be "financially interested" in a transaction between
his corporation and another corporation for a conflict to arise,18 3 section 713
34
now requires that the financial interest be substantial.
Apparently the intent of the legislature was to provide greater liberality for
self-dealing by directors. However, for a statute that was designed "to provide
clarity,"'' 35 the insertion of such an ambiguous term seems unfortunate. How
great must the director's interest be to reach substantial proportions? Does the
term substantial connote a strictly quantitative evaluation by the courts or
does it refer to the nature of the interest as well? For example, one or two
percent ownership of stock in another corporation might enable an interested
director to dictate both the terms and outcome of a transaction where stock
control is evenly divided between proponents and opponents of the transaction.
While quantitatively insignificant, the nature of the interest could easily affect
the director's judgment by providing strong incentives for abuse of his position.
Connecticut's statute has a similar provision which has the commendable
feature of at least clarifying what a substantial interest is not. 30 A pure debt
interest of less than ten percent, for instance, does not constitute a substantial
interest. 137
Under federal law, five to ten percent ownership of stock by the interested
director in the corporation with which he is dealing may activate certain disIV.

SECTION

130. For a particularly perceptive analysis of section 713 prior to its revision In 1971
see Hoffman.
131. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
132. See text accompanying notes 142-43, 152 infra.
133. See text accompanying notes 66-83 supra.
134. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713(a) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
135. Weiss, Business Assodations and Securities Regulation, 23 Syracuse L. Rev. 331, 332
(1972).
136. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-323(d) (1958).
137. "'[Slubstantial interest' shall exclude: (i) The interest of a person in a corporation

...as a debt or equity holder therein where the debt or equity held is less than ten percent
of the outstanding debt or equity, as the case may be, of such corporation ....

(d) (2).

"

Id. § 33-323
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closure requirements. For example, the Securities Exchange Act of 193438 re-

quires disclosure of the director's interest for proxy purposes 3 0 where his

ownership exceeds ten percent of the other corporation's "equity interest."

Connecticut's statute and the federal provision seem to augur a quantitative
interpretation of the term "substantial." Such an interpretation, however, would

be unfortunate since a director's business judgment may be influenced by factors
other than the size of his interest, such as the opportunity to make a quick

profit.140 Consequently, the addition of the term "substantial" to section 713

may have the deleterious effect of providing the interested director with a loop-

hole through which to avoid the disclosure, approval and fairness requirements
of section 713.141 While it may be argued that such an approach is in step with

New York's liberal trend toward allowing the transactions of interested directors
to stand, 142 it constitutes a clear departure from the statutory standards in
43

other jurisdictions.
A realistic interpretation would require that a director make disclosure
whenever his interest in the transaction is personal' 4 4 or financial. 14 5 The principle is equitable; duty must prevail over such interests.
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To say that interests

that are less than substantial will not interfere with such duty is to disregard
the realities of the marketplace. Nor can it successfully be argued that the

interests of the corporation and its shareholders will nevertheless be protected
138. Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1970). This act was initially designed to
close "a loophole in the protections against fraud ... by prohibiting individuals or companies
from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase." SEC Securities Exchange
Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). It has also helped to increase efficiency in the securities
market by channeling capital to the most efficient companies. Knauss, Disclosure Requirements-Changing Concepts of Liability, 24 Bus. Law. 43 (1968). For an account of the
origin of this provision see Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws,
22 Bus. Law. 793, 922 (1967).
139. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1972).
140. Still another relevant factor is the relationship which the value of the director's
interest bears to his overall wealth and salary. Wadmond, Conflicts of Business Interests,
17 Bus. Law. 48, 51 (1961).
141. However, it is possible that the legislature intended to define substantial interest
in terms of any interest which might reasonably affect the director's judgment.
142. See Section II supra. Marsh has described the general trend as having "progressed
from condemnation, to toleration, to encouragement of conflict of interest." Marsh 57.
But cf. Loyer, Negligent Management of Corporations, 9 Clev.-Tilar. L. Rev. 554, S58 (1960).
143. See Cal. Corp. Code § 820 (West 1955); Ga. Code Ann. § 22-716 (1970); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 78.140 (1969). In North Carolina any interest that is "adverse" raises a conflict of
interest problem. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-30(b) (1965). Pennsylvania retained a provision
requiring a simple "financial interest" when they repealed their statute in 1968. Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Supp. 1972).
144. 3 Fletcher § 942; cf. Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-816(1) (Supp. 1972) ("personal or
adverse interest").
145. Such financial interests generally result from stock owned by the director in the
other corporation. 3 Fletcher § 944.
146. See ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. 2d § 41, at 842 (1971).
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by section 717 of the New York Business Corporation Law147 which requires

that directors discharge their duties with due diligence and in good faith. Good
faith alone will not make a transaction "fair.'11 48 Furthermore, anyone bringing
an action under section 717 must combat the "presumption that a director or
officer performs his duty" in the manner prescribed if his judgments are based
in good faith
"on reports of properly designated corporate officers and ac49
1

countants."'
Due to the ambiguity of the term "substantial" and the resulting possibility
of a director evading responsibility for his self-dealing, it might be advisable
for the New York legislature to consider deleting this term. This would allow
the courts to focus attention on the real issue-whether by an objective test
the interest may reasonably be expected to affect the director's judgment. 1 0
The fiduciary bond between director and corporation was further weakened
by a second addition to the revised statute. Under the former version, the director was required to disclose the fact of his interest, unless it was already
known to the board, committee or shareholders, in order for the contract not
to be avoided because of his interest alone.' 0 ' The revised section, however,
simply requires knowledge or disclosure of the material facts concerning his
interest.' 52 By inserting the term "material," the legislature has "expressly
openfed] a wide aiea for the exercise of discretion" by the courts.153 This
added flexibility will hopefully be exercised with care since it may serve to
encourage abuses by unscrupulous interested directors.
Under the current provision, only the material facts as to the director's in-

147. Section 717 provides in pertinent part: "Directors and officers shall discharge the
duties of their respective positions in good faith and with that degree of diligence, care
and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like
positions." N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 717 (McKinney 1963). See DeCapriles & McAniff, The
Financial Provisions of the New (1961) New York Business Corporation Law, 36 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 1239, 1271 (1961); Henn, The Philosophies of the New York Business Corporation
Law of 1961, 11 Buffalo L. Rev. 439 (1962).
148. Chelrob v. Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 461-62, 57 NE.2d 825, 834 (1944). Indeed, It Is
not until after the requirements of § 717 have been met that reference should be made to
§ 713. 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 840, 845 (1967).
149. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 717, Comment (McKinney 1963).
150. Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 503, 552 (1846); Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N.Y.
439, 443, 154 N.E. 303, 304 (1926) ; Wadmond, Conflicts of Business Interests, 17 Bus. Law.
48, 58 (1961).
151. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
152. Accord, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1), (2) (Supp. 1970); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 22-716(a)(1)-(2) (1970); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12:84A.(1)-(2) (1969); R.I. Gen. Laws
Ann. § 7-1.1-37.1(a)(1) (Supp. 1972). But see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-30 (1965) which
requires disclosure to the shareholders of the "material facts" and only "knowledge" on the
part of the disinterested directors. See also N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 14A:6-8(1)(a), (b) (1969).
California, Nevada and South Carolina require the disclosure to be noted in the minutes.
Cal. Corp. Code § 820(a) (West 1955); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.140(a) (1969); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 12-18.16(a)(1) (Supp. 1971).
153. Fogelman 155 (Supp. 1972).
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terest in the contract or transaction need be disclosed. The addition of the
phrase "in such contract or transaction," however, appears to constitute a semantical rather than a substantive change since both the previous and current
versions relate specifically to the director's interest rather than to the facts of

the contract or transaction. As a result, an old question as to whether or not
disclosure or knowledge of the director's interest as well as knowledge of the

contract or transaction is required, continues to haunt the present statute.' 5

While it is likely that courts will impose such a requirement, 155 more express
language in the statute would be preferable.
Delaware, for example, requires disclosure or knowledge as to the director's

Any ambiguities seem
interest "and as to the contract or transaction ...,1110
to be resolved by this construction. Disclosure of the interest without disclosure

of the transaction will be insufficient, and will give rise to a power of avoidance
unless the contract is shown to be fair. Such an approach seems particularly

laudable since disclosure of the facts of the transaction is a prerequisite to an
informed evaluation by those approving it. l'

7

The salient addition to the revised statute is the requirement that disclosure
be made "in good faith.' 1 58 By this addition, the New York legislature has
more closely aligned section 713 with sections 820 of the California Corporations Code159 and 144 of the Delaware Corporations Law 00 which also have

good faith provisions. Differences, however, still remain among these statutes.
For instance, while New York requires the director's disclosure to be in good

faith, Delaware requires good faith on the part of the board, committee, or
shareholders in the authorization of the contract or transaction. This require-

ment was inserted in the Delaware Code "to cover cases where there is literal
154.
155.
156.
Ann. §

See Israels § 6.13.
Id.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1970); accord, Georgia, (Ga. Code
22-716 (1970)); Louisiana, (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12:84 (1969)); Pennsylvania,

15, § 1409.1A()-(2) (Supp. 1972)); South Carolina, (S.C. Code Ann.
(Pa. Stat. Ann. tit.
§ 12-18.16(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1971)); and Tennessee, (Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-S16(1)(a)-(b)
(Supp. 1972)).
157. Blum v. Fleishhacker, 21 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. Cal. 1937), modified, 109 F.2d 543
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 665 (1940). Indeed, without full knowledge of the transactions there can be no ratification, in which case the transaction may be set aside. See
Melgard v. Moscow Idaho Seed Co., 73 Idaho 265, 273, 251 P.2d 546, 551 (1952); Lutherland, Inc. v. Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143, 154, 53 A.2d 143, 148 (1947).
158. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
159. Section 820 of the California Corporations Code provides, in pertinent part, that
directors and officers shall exercise their powers "in good faith, and with a view to the
interests of the corporation." No transaction made with an interested director is either
void or voidable due to the director's interest alone provided the transaction is approved
or ratified "in good faith by a majority vote or written consent of shareholders entitled to
vote.' Cal. Corp. Code § 820(b) (West 1955).
160. Delaware requires that the board or committee authorize the contract or trans8,
action in good faith or be approved in good faith by the shareholders. Del. Code Ann. tit.
§ 144(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1970).
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compliance with the requirement of director or stockholder approval, but some
subterfuge has been employed or other impropriety exists."''
It seems apparent that the good faith provisions in both statutes were aimed
at the same problem-the interested director who might otherwise try to
dominate the board and have an unfair contract approved.' 0 2 Thus, the distinction is primarily a matter of emphasis. New York's approach attempts to prohibit the director from acting unscrupulously while Delaware's strives to insure
resistance by the board to undue pressure on the part of the interested director.
Since good faith disclosure was already mandated by implication under section
713102 prior to its revision, and more generally by section 717,104 it is debatable
whether this addition was necessary.'0 5 A more significant revision might have
been to require good faith in approving the transaction. This addition, when
coupled with the implication of a duty to disclose in good faith, would have
had the effect of situating the New York statute directly alongside California's
which requires good faith in disclosure and authorization. 100 Such a dual requirement has the benefit of providing an added avenue of attack for the
minority stockholder who seeks to challenge the validity of the transaction. That
is, faithlessness by either those approving the transaction or the disclosing
director may become an appropriate subject of judicial scrutiny.
An important change in section 713 is a provision authorizing the board or
committee to approve a transaction involving an interested director simply by
unanimous vote of the disinterested directors "if the votes of the disinterested
directors are insufficient to constitute an act of the board as defined in section

708

.

...

"16

Section 708 provides that an act of the board results from "the

vote of a majority of the directors present at the time of the vote, if a quorum
is present at such time . . .. "168 Accordingly, where a quorum is not present,
the revised statute still protects the transaction from voidability for reason
alone of the adverse interest.
This, apparently, would be the case even where there is only one disinterested
director at the meeting, provided he approves the transaction.10 9 Due to the
likelihood of undue influence 70 by the interested directors, no other state,
161.

S. Arsht & NV. Stapleton, Analysis of the New Delaware Corporation Law 327

(1967).
162. Cf. Kessler 76.
163. See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
164. See notes 147-48 supra and accompanying text.
165. However, since section 717 already requires directors to carry out their duties in
good faith, it could be argued that this addition was intended to raise the standard of this
subdivision. Such an interpretation would be more in accord with the cardinal rule of
statutory interpretation that no part of the law should be construed as surplusage if a
legitimate construction can be found which will give force and meaning to the whole
statute. H. Black, Construction and Interpretation of the Laws 165 (2d ed. 1911).
166. See note 159 supra and accompanying text.
167. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
168. Id. § 708 (McKinney 1963).
169. Fogelman 155 (Supp. 1972).
170. The fear seems to be that subtle pressure will be brought to bear on the solitary
director which would not be present if another disinterested director were also voting.
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except Delaware, 171 has been willing to go this far. Moreover, it is hard to
imagine a more "embarrassing and invidious position" than that of the lone
director who is called to "pass upon, scrutinize and check the transactions and
accounts of one of [his] own body .... ,'172 For these reasons, it is submitted
that this statute should be revised to require the affirmative votes of at least
two disinterested directors for approval. 173 This device would serve to further
insure against undue influence by dominating directors without unnecessarily
burdening the approval process.
Perhaps the most important amendment, and one that has generated predominantly negative comment, 174 is a provision which establishes the burden
of proving fairness.1 75 In explaining this addition, a Memoranda of the Joint
Legislative Committee to Study Revision of the Corporation Laws17" declared
that "[ilf full and fair disclosure was made, the contract cannot be avoided by
the corporation .... ",77Absent such disclosure, the contract can be avoided
by the corporation, "unless the interested director can establish that, despite
171. The Delaware statute simply requires the director's disclosure and authorization
"by the affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors, even though the
disinterested directors be less than a quorum ......
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1)
(Supp. 1970).
172. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 598, 606 (1875), quoted in larsh 37.
See Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553, 573 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1859).
173. North Carolina expressly requires a majority of disinterested directors to approve
the transaction by a vote of "not less than two" of the disinterested directors. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 55-30(b)(1) (1965).
174. See Fogelman 154-55 (Supp. 1972); Weiss, supra note 135, at 334-35. See also G.
Hornstein, Supplemental Analysis of Business Corporation Law, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law Supp.
app. 1, 78-79 (McKinney Supp. 1972). Professor Hornstein's analysis of the revised statute
may be a misinterpretation. See text accompanying notes 181-84 infra.
175. The section provides in pertinent part:
If ... good faith disclosure of the material facts as to the director's interest in the contract
or transaction and as to any such common directorship, officership or financial interest is
made to the directors or shareholders, or known to the board or committee or shareholders
approving such contract or transaction, as provided in paragraph (a), the contract or transaction may not be avoided by the corporation for the reasons set forth in paragraph (a).
If there was no such disclosure or knowledge, or if the vote of such interested director was
necessary for the approval of such contract or transaction at a meeting of the board or
committee . . . the corporation may avoid the contract . . . unless the party or parties

thereto shall establish affirmatively that the contract . . . was fair and reasonable as to
the corporation at the time it was approved by the board, a committee or the shareholders.
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713(b) (McKinney Supp. 1972) ; see text accompanying notes 183-85
infra.
176. joint Legislative Committee to Study Revision of Corporation Laws, Explanatory
Memoranda, accompanying S. 1223-C, A. 1328 C (Apr. 21, 1971), New York State Legislative
Annual 128 (1971).
177. Id. (emphasis added). According to the Memoranda, section 713 was changed "to
conform this 'conflict-of-interest' statute to Section 715 of the Not-for-Profit Corporation
Law adopted at the 1970 session of the Legislature.' Id. Section 715, however, does not purport to dispense with the fairness requirement, instead it provides that in certain cases the
contract or transaction may not be avoided by reason alone of the interest of the director
or officer. N.Y. Not-for-Profit Corp. Law § 715(a)-(b) (McKinney 1970). For an analysis of
section 715 and the effect of the 1970 amendment thereto see McDonald, Business Associations, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 249, 256 (1971).
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the nondisclosure, the transaction was fair and reasonable to the corporation
when made."17 8 This Memoranda again'17

raises the question whether full

is sufficient to prevent avoidance despite
disclosure of the director's interest
80
unfairness in the transaction.
The language of the Memorandum, according to one commentator, "blatantly
validates a transaction even if unfair, setting only one prerequisite: disclosure
or fairness."'181 This has correctly been considered a "monstrous" alternative
which would constitute "a wholly indefensible reversal or abrogation of fiduciary
standards for a director ....,,182 Fortunately, language in the statute appears
to rebut such a construction.
Subsection (2) (b) states that disclosure prevents avoidance only "for the
reasons set forth in paragraph (a),"'83 i.e., for reason alone of the director's
interest, presence, or voting at the meeting of the board or committee which
approves the contract or transaction. Accordingly, it seems likely that courts
will disregard what may amount to a legislative attempt to "out-Delaware
Delaware,"' 4 and allow the fairness of the transaction to be challenged whether
disclosure has been made or not.' 88 Under this interpretation, unfairness would
have to be shown by the party seeking to avoid the transaction where disclosure is made.' 8 6 In the absence of disclosure, the statute clearly allows avoidcorporation unless the interested party affirmatively shows its
ance by18the
7
fairness.
The additions to the current version of section 713 of the New York Business
Corporation Law have obviously done little to clarify this controversial statute.
Moreover, these additions have unduly relaxed the fiduciary duty owed by the
director to his corporation and its stockholders. However, failure to incorporate
a much needed addition may also have adverse effects on parties involved in
such transactions.
Section 713 relates exclusively to corporate directors. However, officers as well
as directors stand in a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and its stock178. Legislative Annual, supra note 176, at 128.
179. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra.
180. Weiss, supra note 135, at 334. There appears to be no rational reason for continuing this confusion and "further complicat[ing] an already murky area of the law."
Id. at 335 & n.23.
181.

Hornstein, supra note 174, at 78.

182. Id. But see note 176 supra. See also Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120
Cal. App. 2d 157, 260 P.2d 823 (1st Dist. 1953); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remllard-Dandini

Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1st Dist. 1952).
183. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713(b) (McKinney Supp. 1972); see note 175 supra.
184. Hornstein, supra note 174, at 79.
185. Weiss, supra note 135, at 335.
186. The structure of section 713 seems to preclude any other interpretation. Absent
disclosure the burden is on the directors. Consequently, the inescapable implication is that
where the interest is revealed the burden is on those desiring to avoid the transaction.
See Epstein v. United States, 174 F.2d 754, 764-65 (6th Cir. 1949).
187. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 713(b) (McKinney Supp. 1972).

19731

INTERESTED DIRECTORS

holdersrs8 and owe a similar duty of loyalty.16 Accordingly, a duty of disclosing
adverse interests should be imposed on officers at least to the extent required
from directors. Indeed, it can be argued that a higher standard should be required from officers since they often have greater opportunity and authority
than directors in the making of business decisions at the operating level. 100
Most states with interested director statutes recognize this fact and impose
a duty of disclosure on officers as well as directors. 1 1 Others inexplicably do
not.1 92 In the latter states the benefit of certainty achieved from codification is
consequently lost in regard to officers. This result is particularly unfortunate
in jurisdictions such as New York which has long been the victim of confused
judicial treatment of the conflicts issue. Accordingly, it is suggested that the
New York legislature remedy this omission by incorporating a duty of disclosure for officers in section 713 of the New York Business Corporation Law.
V.

A.

AN OvRvirw

The "Fairness" Test

The evolution and recent codification of case law relating to interested directors' contracts has generally been acclaimed as coupling business realities
with protection against over reaching directors.' 03 According to proponents of
this view, "fairness" is a sufficient requirement to protect both the corporation
10 5
by the
and the shareholder.19 The argument is that "careful scrutiny"'
courts adequately safeguards the corporation in those cases where the director
fails to disclose his interest. 0 6 This conclusion is highly suspect and has been

188. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Sup. CL 1939).
189. Lazenby v. Henderson, 241 Mlass 177, 135 N.E. 302 (1922); Wendt v. Fischer,
243 N.Y. 439, 154 N.E. 303 (1926).
190. Wadmond, supra note 140, at 51.
191. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144 (Supp. 1970); Ga. Code Ann. § 22-716 (1970); La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 12:84 (1969); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 78.140 (1969); Pa. Stat Ann. tit. 15, § 1409-1
(Supp. 1972); S.C. Code Ann § 12-18.16 (Supp. 1971).
192. Like New York, North Carolina covers only transactions in which a director has
an adverse interest N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-30 (1965).
193. According to Professor Ballantine, "[i]n . . . financial dealings and inter-corporate
relationships, it is better for the corporations concerned to have their directors free to take
part in dealings with other corporations of which they are also directors...." Ballantine 182.
Indeed, as Professor Hornstein has pointed out, "the very reason why some [directors] are
elected" is to deal with their own corporation. Hornstein § 439, at 542.
194. It was, in fact, suggested over twenty years ago that transactions involving "all
of the directors and carried by the votes of all of them" should not be vitiated if they were
"found to have been honestly arrived at, and fair in [their] effect . ...

"

Stevens, supra

note 18, at 183. It is interesting to note, however, that the late Professor Stevens considered
failure to disclose a sufficient ground for avoiding the transaction. Id.
195. In attempting to ascertain the contract's fairness, courts have alluded to the expectations of the parties, the objective reasonableness of the transaction and the good faith of
the interested directors. See text accompanying notes 206-16 infra.
196. Ballantine 182-83. In scrutinizing transactions between corporations with interlocking
directorates, courts often look to the extent of the director's interest in each corporation.
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criticized for ignoring the fundamental nature of the fairness conaccurately
197
cept.
"Fairness" is a nebulous concept. As a result, it is often exceedingly difficult
for a court to determine whether a transaction was fair and reasonable when
approved. 198 Judge Collins, in Heller v. Boylan, 99 eloquently criticized this
test by protesting that:
No blueprints are furnished. The elements to be weighed are incalculable; the
or arbitrariness would be...
imponderables, manifold. To act out of whimsy or caprice
200
the precise antithesis of justice; it would be a farce.
The result of judicial difficulty in assessing fairness is that interested di-

rector's transactions have been given the benefit of the doubt absent a "flagrant
[case], in which the conduct of the interested director practically amounts to
fraud .

...

,,201 Not, for example, until after the most painstaking analysis of

facts showing "startling" unfairness, a dominating influence by the common
director, and exceedingly oppressive consequences, did Mr. Justice Cardozo find
an interested202director's contract voidable in Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas &
Electric Co.

A further ramification of the amorphous nature of the "fairness" test has
been the development of a battery of conflicting standards in its application.
Pennsylvania, for instance, currently requires that the director act in "good
faith" 20 3 and for the common interest of the corporation. 204 Indeed, the welfare
of the corporation must have been of primary importance in the director's
decision-making process. 20 5 Moreover, the burden of proof is placed on the
director to show he was not unjustly enriched.200 And, the corporation need
207
not have suffered a loss to hold the director liable for an "unfair transaction."
As far as it goes, this approach makes sense. Where the director's interest In the two
corporations is disproportionate there is less chance of unbiased performance by the director.
Id. at 183. See generally Lattin, supra note 19, § 80.
197. See Marsh 55-57.
198. Hetherington, supra note 74, at 149-50; see 1960 U. Ill. L.F. 452, 455.
199. 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 263 App. Div. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131
(Ist Dep't 1941). The issue was the reasonableness of compensation paid to executives of
the American Tobacco Company.
200. Id. at 679.
201. Hetherington, supra note 74, at 150.
202. 224 N.Y. 483, 488-89, 121 N.E. 378, 379-80 (1918).
203. Bailey v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 194, 189 A. 320, 324 (1937). The old common law
rule in Pennsylvania was that transactions between two corporations having a majority
of common directors were presumptively fraudulent. Pennsylvania Knitting Mills v. Bayard,
287 Pa. 216, 221, 134 A. 397, 399 (1926).
204. Evans v. Armour & Co., 241 F. Supp. 705, 710-11 (ED. Pa. 1965). Indeed, it has
long been the rule in Pennsylvania that a director's judgment must be "untrammeled by
any hostile interest in himself or others." Bird Coal & Iron Co. v. Humes, 157 Pa. 278,
288, 27 A. 750, 752 (1893).
205. In re Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 16 F. Supp. 941 (Em. Pa. 1936). See South
Side Trust Co. v. Washington Tin Plate Co., 252 Pa. 237, 97 A. 450 (1916).
206. Bailey v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 194, 189 A. 320, 324 (1937).
207. In Pennsylvania, if the director utilizes his position in pursuit of a personal profit
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New Jersey adheres to a completely objective standard-the "arm's length
bargaining" test-employed by the Supreme Court in Pepper v. Litton.2 s Its
primary utility is that it allows the small public shareholder to gain the assistance of equity merely by demonstrating facts "which could lead to a finding
of unfairness ....
,,209 New York, with remarkable versatility, has announced its
adherence to a variety of tests in determining the fairness of transactions involving interested directors. The cases weave in and out between the arm's
211
length bargain test,210 and a good faith test.
In 1965, however, the New York Court of Appeals, in Case v. New York
Central R.R., 212 established what has been described as "the expectations
test." 21 3 Under this approach the parties simply get what they bargained for
and the court gains a conceptually neat framework within which to scrutinize
the fairness of the transaction. However, the expectations referred to are only
those which arise between the parties to the transaction. Consequently, one not
a party, a minority stockholder for instance, is left remediless. For this reason
even permissive Delaware has outlawed this test as "against the grain of ...
decisions . . . [and] in derogation of duties we have so long regarded as
214
fiduciary."
Regardless of the jurisdiction, it appears clear that the interested director is
left uncertain as to transactions with his corporation or with another corporation
in which he has an interest. While it has been argued that the very uncertainty
of the fairness test restrains a director from involving himself in such transor advantage other than one also enjoyed by the shareholders at large it becomes immaterial
"that his dealings may not have caused a loss or been harmful to the corporation . .. .
Lutherland Inc. v. Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143, 151, 53 A.2d 143, 147 (1947).
208. 308 U.S. 295 (1939). See Marcy v. Guanajuato Dev. Co., 228 F. 150, 156 (D.N.J.
1915).
209. Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J. 450, 477, 226 A.2d 585, 599-600 (1967).
210. Cheirob Inc. v. Barrett, 265 App. Div. 455, 457, 39 N.Y.S.2d 625, 627 (2d Dep't
1943), modified, 293 N.Y. 442, 57 N.E.2d 825 (1944).
211. See, e.g., Pink v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 164 Misc. 128, 135, 298 N.Y.S. 544,
553 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Genesee Valley & Wyo. Ry. v. Retsof Mining Co., 15 Misc. 187, 195,
36 N.Y.S. 896, 901 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
212. 15 N.Y.2d 150, 204 N.E.2d 643, 256 N.YS.2d 607 (1965). "[Tlhe agreement must
be looked at with the knowledge which those who entered into it had when it was executed
." Id. at 158, 204 N.E.2d at 647, 256 N.YS.2d at 612.
213. See Note, Corporate Fiduciary Doctrine In the Context of Parent-Subsidiary
Relations, 74 Yale LJ. 338, 349 (1964); cf. Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair
Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 Yale L.J. 1327, 1359-61
(1958). Courts have often used this approach without specific reference. See Everett v.
Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 233, 43 N.E. 2d 18, 20 (1942); cf. Ewen v. Peoria & E. Ry.,
78 F. Supp. 312, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 914 (1949). Under this approach
it is the objective rather than subjective manifestations of the parties which are judicially
construed. Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 Yale L.J. 739, 743-44 (1919).
214. Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 261 A.2d 911, 916 (Del. Ch. 1970). Refusing to apply
the "expectations test," the court further acknowledged the unsuitability of the "armslength" approach, opting instead for the fairness standard utilized in Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (1952).
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actions, 215 he may in fact be motivated by this uncertainty to "take a chance."
Indeed, it seems likely that the greater the possible personal benefit to the
director the less the uncertainty of this test will serve to inhibit his activities.
In this sense, the test may not serve as an effective deterrent to abusive selfdealing but rather as an incentive.216
A similar problem is presented by the fact that "[a] transaction may be fair
and still not [be] the best deal the corporation could have obtained if it had
had independent representation. 21 7 Thus, a director may be constrained from
alternatives to an otherwise fair transaction in which he has an
seeking 21out
8
interest.
Aside from the problems of establishing a coherent fairness test and the
deleterious effects that may result from its application, a further problem, that
of establishing the burden of proving fairness, 21 9 has contributed to the confusion
surrounding this test.
B.

The Burden of Proof

Allocation of the burden of proving an interested director's transaction "fair"
or "unfair" may have a critical impact on the outcome of the case. 220 There are
basically three views as to who has the burden of proof.2 2 1 The majority view
is that the party seeking to have the contract upheld must establish its fairness
by a preponderance of the evidence.222 This was the rule enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. 223 A number of
cases, however, have taken the opposite tack and required the party seeking to
avoid the transaction to show its unfairness. 224 Under the third view, the party
215. Wadxnond, supra note 140, at 62; see 61 Harv. L. Rev. 335, 343 (1948).
216. Even if it does inhibit self-dealing, this approach should not be given carte blanche
approval since such transactions are often legitimate and beneficial to the corporation.
See 61 Harv. L. Rev. 335, 341 (1948).
217. Marsh 57.
218. Hetherington, supra note 74, at 150 n.232.
219. See Note, Internal Corporate Conflict of Interests, 34 Temp. L.Q. 290 (1961).

220. See generally 61 Harv. L. Rev. 335 (1948). Where the evidence of fairness Is in
equilibrium, any presumption becomes particularly significant. In such a case the court
should resolve the issue against the party who failed to carry the burden. C. McCormick,
Evidence § 322, at 686 (1954).
221. Note, Internal Corporate Conflict of Interests, 34 Temp. L.Q. 290, 295 (1961). For
a judicial review of the burden of proof see Blaustein v. Pan Am. Petroleum & Transp. Co.,
174 Misc. 601, 21 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
222. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Cathedral Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty
Corp., 228 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1955). This view is applied uniformly to both director-corporation
and inter-corporate transactions. Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 598

(1921).
223.

254 U.S. 590 (1921).

224. This view is also known as the "Massachusetts Rule." Durfee v. Durfee & Canning,
Inc., 323 Mass. 187, 199, 80 N.E.2d 522, 527 (1948); Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc.,
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seeking to avoid the contract has the burden of producing evidence of unfairness, after which the burden of225going forward shifts to the opposing party
to show that the contract was fair.
The theoretical basis for the majority rule established in Geddes seems to be
that these transactions afford such great opportunity and temptation for
misuse of power that the interested directors should be required to show the
"entire fairness" of the transaction. 22 It has further been argued in support
of this approach, that "those who would sustain the transactions generally
possess greater knowledge of the salient facts" 227 than those seeking to avoid it.
It has been said in defense of the second view that the law presumes that
corporate managers carry out their duties honestly and in good faith.2-s This
determination, however, appears to ignore well established precedent- 0 that the
"business judgment rule '' 3° does not strictly apply to transactions involving
interested directors. Nevertheless, it is further argued that the second view, as
opposed to the others, would not result in a multitude of suits by shareholders.
This may not be a real problem, however, in view of the difficulties inherent
in bringing such an action.? 1 Furthermore, it is possible for a director to protect
himself from this burden by disclosing his conflicting interest and securing
2 ratification by a majority of disinterested shareholders. 3
The third view is capsulized in the approach taken in Mayflower Hotel
-a
Stockholders Protective Committee v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,2
where the
Nagel v. Northern Ill Gas Co., 12 I.
App. 2d 413, 424, 139 N.E.2d 810, 816 (1st Dist. 1957); cases cited in 3 Fletcher § 921,
at 383 n.39.
225. Mayflower Hotel Stockholders Protective Comm. v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 73 F.
Supp. 721 (D.D.C. 1947), rev'd, 173 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1949); see Scofield v.Marinette
Saw Mill Co., 153 Ill. App. 469 (1st Dist. 1910).
226. Geddes v. Anaconda Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921); Kennan v. Eshleman,
23 DeL Ch. 234, 243-44, 2 A.2d 904, 908 (Sup. CL 1938). It has, in fact, been urged that
all self-dealing be handled with "rough hands" by the courts. Lattin, supra note 18, at 565.
227. 1960 U. Ill.
L.F. 452, 455.
228. Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 408, 8 N.E.2d 895, 903 (1937)
(acknowledging and rejecting this argument); see Wentz v. Scott, 10 F.2d 426, 428 (6th
Cir. 1926).
229. See, e.g., David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968):
"[Wihen the persons . . . who control the making of a transaction and the fixing of its
terms, are on both sides, then the presumption and deference to sound business judgment
are no longer present?' Id. at 430-31.
230. In essence, the "business judgment rule" protects the director from liability arising
from mistakes of judgment provided they were honest and within the scope of the powers
and discretion confided to the director. The leading American case is Spering's Appeal,
71 Pa. 11 (1872). But see Comment, Personal Liability of Directors for Corporate Mismanagement, 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. 128, 134 (1916).
231. See text accompanying notes 237-49 infra.
232. Corsicana Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68, 90 (1919) ; see 2 Fletcher §§ 750-85.
233. 73 F. Supp. 721 (D.D.C. 1947).
297 Mass. 398, 411-12, 8 N.E.2d 895, 905 (1937); see
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court held that the mere allegation of a conflict of interest is insufficient to
state a cause of action and that some evidence is first required to establish a
prima facie case and shift the burden of going forward. 23 4 By requiring the
plaintiff to show "some evidence" of unfairness, this approach keeps "deadly
weapons" out of the hands of blackmailers and corporation strikers 23 5 without
requiring a complete display of evidence which the shareholder is ill-equipped
236
to obtain.
Of course, before a transation can be "scrutinized," its fairness tested, and
the burden of proof alloted, the case must be presented to the court. Formidable
obstacles, however, often stand in the plaintiff's way, thereby inhibiting any
determination of the contract's fairness.
C.

Who Will Sue

It would be an obvious anomaly for the very directors who approved an
interested director's transaction to bring an action to set it aside. 231 The
corporation, however, may be willing to bring such an action when corporate
control has changed hands. This usually occurs either through a proxy fight or
by the purchase of a controlling block of shares by new management. Nevertheless, it has been cogently argued that in the former case any suit brought
will most likely be settled out of court "after the smoke of battle has cleared," 238
and that in the latter case the new management should not be allowed to
complain where the purchase was made on the basis of a financial statement
which disclosed the former transactions. In the words of Judge Peck:
[I]t would be inequitable and an unjust enrichment to permit him in the guise of
the corporation to claim against the 28defendants
from whom he bought the corporation
9
for something more than he bought.
The end result is to place the burden of challenging the interested transaction
solely on the shoulders of minority shareholders who must sue derivatively.
The legal gymnastics required for successful prosecution of a derivative
action are well documented. 240 A number of states have provisions denying to
purchasers of stock standing to sue on a cause of action arising prior to the
234. Id. at 724.
235. See Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 673, 710, 53 A. 842, 856 (1903);

Comment, Corporations: Effect of Directors' Adverse Interest or Conflicting Duties to Invalidate Contracts: California Civil Code Section 311, 29 Calif. L. Rev. 480, 494 (1941).
236. See note 227 supra and accompanying text.
237. 61 Harv. L. Rev. 335, 342 (1948).
238. Marsh 55 (footnote omitted).
239. Capitol Wine & Spirit Corp. v. Pokrass, 277 App. Div. 184, 189, 98 N.Y.S.2d 291,
297 (1st Dep't 1950) (concurring opinion), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 734, 98 N.E.2d 704 (1951).
240. See Ballantine 333-74; Stevens, supra note 18, at 783-837; Dodd, Is Effective
Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. Chi. L. Rev.
194, 197 (1935).
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241

and further provisions prohibiting voluntary dismissal or
time of purchase,
compromise without court approval once the action is instituted.242
Some states, including New Jersey,2 43 New York, 244 and Pennsylvania,24 5
provide for the posting of security by shareholders who bring derivative actions
while holding less than a prescribed financial interest in the corporation.240
Although the immediate effect of the New York statute was greatly to diminish the frequency of derivative actions in general,2 4 7 the deterrence of suits
brought by small shareholders was considered a necessary consequence of such
legislation which aimed at the elimination of "strike suits. 2 48
While it may well be argued that the benefits of this legislation "outweigh
its occasional inequities," 249 the fact remains that it deters challenges to the
fairness of interested directors' transactions. In addition, the uncertainty of
the fairness test "further tends to discourage initiation of legitimate suits. - 0
When the hardships of getting a case before the court are coupled with con241. This "contemporaneous ownership" requirement originated in the federal courts
to guard against suits in which diversity judisdiction was obtained by collusive means.
Hawes v. Oakland, 104 US. 450, 461 (1881); see, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 64-223A. (1966);
Cal. Corp. Code § 834 (West 1955); Ga. Code Ann. § 22-615(a)(1) (1970); Iowa Code
Ann. § 496A.43 (1962); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:3-6(1) (1969); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15,
§ 1516 (1967). The old New York common law rule was contra. Pollitz v. Gould, 202 N.Y.
11, 16, 94 N.E. 1088, 1089 (1911). The New York rule, however, was changed by statute
in 1944. Law of Apr. 9, 1944, ch. 667, § 1, [1944] N.Y. Laws 167th Sess. 1454, codified as
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 626(b) (McKinney 1963). Generally speaking, the contemporaneous
ownership rule was established to discourage the practice of purchasing stock for the single
purpose of instituting suit. Stevens, supra note 18, at 814.
242. E.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 626(d) (McKinney 1963). See generally Note, Security
for Expenses Legislation-Summary, Analysis, and Critique, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 263
n.3 (1952). As a practical matter this rule is not always given effect. Hornstein, Problems
of Procedure in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 574, 590 (1942).
243. NJ. Stat. Ann. § 14A:3-6(1) (1969).
244. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 627 (McKinney 1963). This provision was retained despite
criticism. See Bowes, Should New York's "Security for Expenses" Act Be Amended?, 2
Syracuse L. Rev. 37 (1950); Hornstein, The Depth Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits
in New York, 32 Calif. L. Rev. 123, 124-25 (1944).
245. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1516B (1967).
246. In New Jersey the shareholder(s) bringing the action must hold more than $25,000
or 59 of the outstanding shares of any class of the corporation or voting trust certificates or
be subject to security demands by the corporation. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:3-6(3) (1969).
New York requires the same percentage of share holdings and alternatively requires that the
"fair value" exceed $50,000 in order to traverse the security provision. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 627 (McKinney 1963).
247. Hornstein, supra note 244, at 125-27.
248. Stevens, supra note 18, at 816-17; Bowes, supra note 244, at 50-51. The term
"strike suits" is defined to include persons who sue in an attempt to obtain secret settlements
and persons who speculate in attorneys' fees. Ballantine 354.
249. Note, Security for Expenses Legislation, supra note 242, at 281.
250. 61 Harv. L. Rev. 335, 342 (1948).
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fusion surrounding the fairness concept, and the judicial practice of deciding
borderline cases in favor of interested directors, it becomes abundantly clear
that this test is inadequate to protect the corporation and its shareholders from
directorial self-dealing. It is submitted, however, that an additional requirement of complete disclosure would provide such protection.
D. Disclosure
Sunlight, is said to2 5 be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
efficient policeman. 1

The requirement of disclosure dates back at least to 1765 and the by-laws
of the Bank of England.2 52 Its imposition has had the ameliorating effect of
eliminating "inducements to wrongdoing1 25 3 in transactions involving interested
directors. Consequently, one might have expected it to be vigorously applied in
the "pragmatists' environment of the business world of today. 1 254 As mentioned
earlier,255 however, the trend has been not to demand disclosure where "fairness"
can be shown. This trend is unfortunate, not only because of the problems
riddling the fairness test, but also because of the benefits achieved by requiring
disclosure.256 Further, when fairness and disclosure are combined the result is
remarkably synergistic.
1. The Ameliorating Effects of Disclosure
[D]isclosure is the most realistic
means of coping with the ever-present
257
problem of conflicts of interest.

Without going into the merits of attempting to legislate morality and ethics,
it appears clear that corporate directors have historically been lax in regard to
self-regulation of conflicts of interest.2 58 Moreover, one must ponder the
alleged growth of the "corporate conscience ' 250 when faced with a recent poll
of businessmen showing that over forty-two percent would buy shares of another company if they were a member of the board of directors and had knowledge that a merger with that company would enhance the value of the shares
251. L. Brandeis, Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It 62 (1914).
252. Hornstein § 439, at 544. See also A. DuBois, The English Business Company After
the Bubble Act 1720-1800 329 (1938).
253. Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 408, 409 (1962);
see Note, Corporations-Full Disclosure-Breach of Fiduciary Duty Owed by Officer and/or
Director to Minority Stockholders, 19 S.C.L. Rev. 854 (1967).
254. Note, 19 S.C.,. Rev., supra note 253, at 854 (footnote omitted).
255. See text accompanying note 196 supra.
256. See text accompanying notes 261-64 infra.
257. Cary, supra note 253, at 409. Professor Cary is a past Chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
258. One need go no further than the plethora of litigation relating to interested
directors' contracts for support of this proposition. The manifest abuses by self-dealing
directors were the subject of an interesting expos6 just over a decade ago. See Behind the
Conflict at Chrysler, Fortune, Nov. 1960, at 132.
259. A. Berle, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution 113 (1954).
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when the information became public 30o Accordingly, imposition of a disclosure
requirement would help to serve as the "snarling watch-dog"201 that most
directors apparently need. Indeed, by placing the director in a "glass house,"
this requirement serves to restrain unfair dealing because of sensitivity to public
reaction and the possibility of legal action.2-6 2 Disclosure has the added advantage of being "mechanically applied without any of the unsatisfactory effects
which resulted from a rigid bar against any self-dealing."'2 a In other words,
making an undisclosed transaction voidable at the option of the corporation
would provide protection to shareholders but not inhibit legitimate business
dealing, since there seems to be no good reason for a director not to disclose
his interest and the transaction.2G But to say that disclosure should be required
in all cases only begins analysis by giving direction to further inquiry. - 5 The
question of the extent of disclosure necessary must also be resolved.
2. The Degree of Disclosure Required
While it is often stated that "full" or "complete" disclosure is required of
interested directors or officers, 2 66 the more correct approach is that all facts
judgment or aid those approving the transwhich might effect the directors'
267
action should be disclosed.
Accordingly, such facts must be viewed in the context of the business setting
which gave rise to the interested contract or transaction. In a clandestine purchase by a director of shares of stock in his corporation, the effect of the
purchase on the condition and value of the stock may be of material significance. 268 Similarly, where a director purchases real estate from his corporation
which he immediately leases back, thus deriving tax advantages from depredation write-offs, the terms of the transaction, its benefits and disadvantages to
the corporation and the tax advantages to the director should all be clearly
260. Baumhart, How Ethical Are Businessmen?, 39 Harv. Bus. Rev. 6, 16 (July-Aug.
1961).
261.
262.

Marsh 54.
Collier, Conflicts of Interest in the Glass House Age, 24 Fed. BJ. 351 (1964);

see Frankfurter, Securities Act-Social Consequences, Fortune, Aug. 1933, at 5S5.
263.

Hornstein § 439, at 544.

264. Hetherington, supra note 74, at 150. Professor Ballantine, in discussing the attributes
of this procedure, concluded that while disclosure provides an important safeguard in such
transactions he would not establish such a "hard and fast rule" but instead would regard
the failure to disclose "as bearing on the fairness and good faith of the transaction and
whether it is just and reasonable as to the corporation." Ballantine § 71, at 179; accord,
Kaplan, Conflict of Interests . . . Corporate Directors, 50 M1l.B.J. 1072, 1038 (1962).
265. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.).
266. Arrigoni v. Adorno, 129 Conn. 673, 679, 31 A.2d 32, 34 (Sup. Ct. Err. 1943)
("full and frank disclosure").
267. See text accompanying notes 152-53 supra. Most states require disclosure of only
the 'material" terms. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 144 (Supp. 1970); Ga. Code Ann. § 22-716
(1970); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12:84 (1969); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Supp. 1972);
S.C. Code Ann. § 12-18.16 (Supp. 1971); Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-816 (Supp. 1972).
268. See Black v. Simpson, 94 S.C. 312, 315, 77 S.E. 1023, 1025 (1913).
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spelled out.26 9 Perhaps the best general statement of this rule was that made in
270
Wendt v. Fischer:
If dual interests are to be served, the disclosure to be effective must lay bare the
truth, without ambiguity or reservation, in all its stark significance.27 1
VI.

CONCLUSION

Few discordant notes have spoiled the chorus of praise for the metamorphosis
in the law surrounding interested director's contracts.2 72 Certainly it would be
retrogressive to advocate a harkening back to nineteenth century principles of
trust and agency.27 3 Nevertheless, it is submitted that a rethinking, both
judicial and legislative, should be made of our contemporary treatment of
directors' self-dealing. Inquiry might beneficially be focused on the ability of
the "fairness" test to adequately protect the corporation and shareholders from
improprieties by interested directors.
More specifically, it is urged that the New York legislature mandate disclosure by the interested director, not only of his interest but of the material
facts of the transaction as well. Further, revision of section 713 should embody
a clear statement barring unfair transactions even where fully disclosed. Finally,
deletion of the term "substantial" as it relates to the interest that need be disdosed will relieve the courts from the arduous task of determining the legislature's intent for incorporating that term and accordingly will facilitate inquiry
into the actual issue-whether the interest is such that it might reasonably
affect the director's objectivity. Hopefully, incorporation of these suggestions
would help to raise the "level of conduct for fiduciaries . . . higher than that
trodden by the crowd .... ,"274 In this manner, "[n]ot honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive"275 might once again become the
required standard of behavior.
269. See Cary, supra note 253, at 413. See generally Cary, Corporate Financing Through
the Sale and Lease-Back of Property: Business, Tax, and Policy Considerations, 62 Harv. L.
Rev. 1 (1948).

270. 243 N.Y. 439, 154 N.E. 303 (1926) (Cardozo, J.).
271. Id. at 443, 154 N.E. at 304 (citations omitted). See State v. Columbus D. & M. Elec.
Co., 104 Ohio St. 120, 135 N.E. 297 (1922) (intimating a duty to keep corporate records
in a manner conducive to disclosure).
272. But see Marsh 55.
273. But see Bayne, The Fiduciary Duty of Management-The Concept in the Courts,
35 U. Det. L.J. 561, 593 (1958) (advocating an outright prohibition against all intercorporate business where boards interlocked).
274. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (Cardozo, J.).
275. Id.

